Labour’s future defence cuts – inevitable and shameful

This morning’s Telegraph carries a story about a Centre for Policy Studies report warning that Labour’s wasteful record on defence spending risks denting public support for defence in the near future. Sadly this extends to politicians, too; when the next government (of whatever hue) casts around for things to cut, defence is undoubtedly going to be ripe for the axe thanks to the imminent £35bn of unfunded overspends on projects such as Typhoon and the new aircraft carriers.

Labour’s risible approach to defence procurement has seen money flow to Labour constituencies (CVF) and pointless European vanity projects (A400M and Typhoon) even as Geoff Hoon (and others) deliberately refused to provide the requisite body armour to the Army prior to the invasion of Iraq. The RAF has, arguably, seen the worst of Labour’s incompetence, with air-to-air capabilities designed to fight the Soviets supplanting the UAVs, reconnaissance aircraft and strike capabilites that everyone agrees are most likely to be needed in the future. The now almost unavoidable cuts to the size and capability of the RAF and Royal Navy – and, therefore, to our ability to project power on a global scale – are a direct consequence of Labour’s mismanagement and waste, not a peace dividend or a strategic shift in Britain’s global priorities.

So, what’s the damage? The Royal Navy will probably lose one or both of its future aircraft carriers (along with a sub or three), and the RAF will end up smaller and weaker in terms of its offensive capabilities. While we flounder in Afghanistan the public’s indulgence will not extend to unforseeable future conflicts: insurance policies, no matter how vital, tend not to be high on voters’ lists of spending priorities, especially when a bloody ground war is in such sharp focus. There is, however, a lesson to be learned from history here – had John Nott’s proposed defence cuts gone through before 1982, we’d have had no aircraft carriers and Port Stanley would probably be under an Argentine flag today.

Of course, the Army – which does the bulk of the work in Afghanistan – must be protected from the axe. But, as Sierra Leone, Iraq and the Falklands showed, seapower and airpower are also vital parts of Britain’s ability to project power. We lose those capabilities at the risk of losing our ability to influence world affairs. A switch to commercial off-the-shelf procurement – though long overdue – can do little now to prevent cuts and guard against strategic shocks. When those shocks happen – and they will – it will be down to Labour’s waste that we lack the ability to fight back. Is there a more shameful legacy than that?